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State and Federal Powerst
By

B. FRANKLIN*
Most of us were exposed to government and politics in our formal education at a 'time when we had no experience and little interest in either. Since
then we. have been so busy, or think we are, that we have neglected politics,
leaving government to others, only to complain that they are not running .it
as we think they should. Democracy, more than any other form of government known to man, needs strong leadership from the people most qualified
for leadership. When we fail to be interested and exert influence upon government we have no one to blame but ourselves if the results in government
are not satisfactory to us.
Too many of our people who have capacity for leadership neglect both
national and state politics. We are members of service clubs and similar
organizations which, either by provision of a written constitution or by
tacit understanding, are non-political, and in adhering to this principle we
become impotent iridividually and collectively in most, if not all, controversial
issues. We permit intolerable conditions to exist in some of our state institutions; we permit party politics to play havoc with our state merit system,
the civil service; we under-pay our public school teachers and at the same
time complain about the quality of the teaching in our public schools; we
spend our money to advertise the state as a fisherman's paradise and permit
the hands of the state game and fish commission to be tied while the best
part of our streams are closed to public fishing. We complain about the
inroads of federal authority in the regulation of local matters and at the
same time allow conditions to continue which make it improbable if not impossible for our state legislative body to properly discharge its duties. We
are penny wise and pound foolish. We provide that the state legislature
shall meet once in two years and we pay our state legislators the munificent
sum of $1,000 for this important function of state government. At the
same time we think congress should be constantly in session. It is surprising that the legislature does as well as it does under the circumstances.
To correct this I believe our legislature should meet each year and, even
better, that it should meet continuously with compensation adequate to atWALTER
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tract qualified and competent men to our legislative halls. Only by so do,
ing can be expect the state to exercise the power which inherently belongs
to it.
For fear of offending someone or because we are timid to challenge what
we think is wrong we permit such things as an amendment to the state constitution providing for old age assistance. Not that we are opposed to old
age assistance but it should never have been a part of the constitution; rather
it should be a matter subject to the control of the state legislature.
We see many of our people willing to trade economic and political'
independence for promises of security from a presently benevolent government, and while doing so create a political atmosphere in which -man may
again become the victim of government rather than the master of it.
We are alarmed at the top heavy structure of government, particularly
the national government, with its innumerable bureaus, commissions and
administrative bodies; its hordes of administrative personnel who swarm us
under with directives, regulations and required reports, and who, it seems,
increase in numbers at an alarming rate; who delve increasingly into our
every day affairs telling us what we can do, what we must do. We shudder
at the prospect of the tax burden which we must endure to pay the increased
overhead of a federal government which has become a little dizzy in its
power and more and more regards the states as unnecessary evils in present
day government.
Originally the federal government existed only for the benefit of the
states. The constitution of the United States still indicates this theory but
there has been a shift in power so that more and more the once proud sovereign
states become subervient to a government from Washington.
How did this happen? Who did it? Where will we wind up?
The shift in power from the states to the national or federal government
cannot be laid to any single factor.
Business interests are partly to blame. It was business which, unable or
unwilling to govern itself, asked for government intervention by approving
and enforcing codes of fair practice, got them in the N.I.R.A., but as is
usually the case got more than they asked for and paved the way for federal
regulation through the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
It was business which caused a corporation to be classed as a person
under the fourteenth amendment and thereby make corporations subject
to federal authority when it was never intended that the fourteenth amendmnt should include any one but a natural person.
States, by failing to exercise their sovereign powers in dealing with matters of public interest (which failure was due in part at least by the failure of
state legislatures to meet the additional responsibilities imposed upon them
by changing conditions), have created a vacuum into which it was natural
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that the federal power would move. Merely putting a law on the state
statute books is by no means full exercise of the state power. There must be
enforcement of state laws and in this respect many states fail miserably.
Congress has played its part by passing laws not within the expressly
enumerated powers of congress and which by fair interpretation or implication are not included within the incidental powers of congress.
The Supreme Court of the United States has had a lion's share in the
process of expanding the federal power and in degrading states power by
making itself an appellate court from state supreme court decisions, by reading into laws intentions which cannot be drawn from the law itself, and by
upholding laws of congress which are outside the letter and outside the
spirit of the constitution as that spirit was conceived by its framers.
Any discussion of federal power and states rights must, of necessity,
revolve around the constitution of the United States, the events which preceded its adoption, and the events which have occurred since its ratification.
There is no document so extolled by our people, perhaps by the literate
people of the world, as is the constitution of The United States. Every
public official and quasi public official is sworn to uphold it. There are
probably more speaking acquaintances with it than with any other document
in the world. Other nations have used it as a pattern. Mexico's constitution
is remarkably parallel and I am told that even the dormant constitution of
Russia is strikingly similar. It is quoted and misquoted, paraphrased and
referred to by people of all walks of life; by politicians, preachers, reformers;
by teachers, business men, students, workmen, farmers, and even by criminals.
It is relied upon by proponents of license as well as by truthful advocates
of freedom. It is held up to the world by the dogmatists as the panacea for
all human ills, as a pattern for all peoples in the quest of protection of individual and human rights against tyranny, and as recipe to all nations
who would live in peace with their neighbors.
Yet for all these evidences of familiarty there is so little specific, concrete, accurate knowledge of that great chart of government; so little realization that its guarantees of liberty are not grants of liberty by the government
to the people but limitations upon the exercise of governmental power--limitations which the people themselves put there and should ever safeguard. The
very foundation for that much vaunted "American Way of Life" is badly
neglected and misunderstood by our people; we are far too prone to take the
blessings of liberty for granted.
The constitution of The United States is relatively short, it is written
in comparatively simple language, it has been read and reread by many people, including teachers, who have taken its simple words at their face value,
with little or no knowledge of the political atmosphere in which it was born,
of the struggle between advocates of strong centralized power and the advocates of strong state power, of the political theories argued and deliberately
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discarded by the convention before the delegates affixed their signatures to
its final draft, and with little understanding of the fear by Americans that
the proposed new government would be just another tyrant to oppress the
common man of this continent. This feeling was perhaps best exemplified
by Rhode Island, the state founded by Roger Williams, one of our greatest
advocates of individual freedom. Rhode Island refused even to send delegates to the convention; she was the last state to ratify the constitution and
then only after the people had once rejected ratification by a substantial majority.
North Carolina and Virginia, too, were slow to ratify the constitution
feeling that the rights of the states and of the people were not sufficiently
safeguarded. Each proposed many amendments; and, as we know, the bill
of rights, consisting of the first ten amendments, was adopted within three
years and are considered as a part of the original constitution.
In 1793 the states were shocked by the federal court decision (Chisholm
vs. Georgia) which recognized a power in the federal courts to entertain a
case against a state by one not a citizen of the state and, jealous of this infringement upon the sovereignty of the states, were quick to ratify the
eleventh amendment in 1795 which forbade the recurrence of such an event.
Reading the constitution and rereading it is only the first step in constitutional law study. Practically every sentence of the constitution, one
might almost say every word, has been the subject of controversy and ultimate
interpretation by court decisions. No study of the constitution is worthy to
be called such without a study of these cases. Many teachers, without knowing it, are guilty of giving out much misinformation about the constitution.
When political union of the states occurred in 1777 thru confederation,
the states had already been engaged in the war of independence for more
than two years. It was quite natural that the people of the states should
distrust strong government and that in the Articles of Confederation only
a loose union was effected. The Articles of Confederation are in rhany
provisions strikingly similar to the constitution and it is obvious, even to
the casual reader, that they were drawn upon heavily by the framers of
the constitution. The articles formed merely a league of friendship for the
common defense against foreign invaders. There was no power to collect
taxes for the support of the federal government and therefore the federal
government was almost powerless. Some provisions of the articles are worthy
of notice in this discussion. The second article, for instance, stated that each
state retained its sovereignty, freedom and independence and every power,
jurisdiction, and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
to the United States. Except for the deletion of the word "expressly" this is
very much the language of the tenth amendment adopted in 1793, but of
course the omission of that word is highly significant.
After the War of Independence trade between the states and with for-

DICTA

eign countries was obstructed by barriers and handicaps created by the states
and by the helplessness of the states against marauders flying the flag of
foreign nations. It was primarly to correct this bad situation in trade that
the second continental congress approved a convention to amend the Articles
of Confederation but with no thought in mind of revolutionary changes in
the federal system. The delegates to this meeting, which we now call the
Constitutional Convention went considerably astray from the task which
they had been called upon to perform. When the delegates, after much
debate, decided upon the bold stroke of revamping the system of government, several delegates left the convention, refusing to participate in any
such departure from their stated instructions. The story of the convention
with its heated debates, and ultimate compromises forms an interesting chapter
in our national history. So do the events between its proposal and ratifica
tion of the constitution. Some historians tell us that had it not been for the
great confidence in George Washington and the general belief that he would
be our first president the states would probably have refused to ratify the
proposed constitution.
In the first twelve years of our history under the constitution there was
little debate over the division of state and federal powers. The United States
Supreme Court had not played a conspicious part in these twelve years; but
during the last weeks of his term as president John Adams appointed John
Marshall to be the third Chief Justice of The Supreme Court and things
began to happen. Marshall was a Federalist. He had served in the revolutionary forces with Washington, had seen the suffering of our armies and
had long since recognized the need for a strong national government if the
United States was to become a power among world nations. By a series of
decisions lasting thru his thirty-five years as Chief Justice, his court fixed
the power of the Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional laws of congress
and of the state legislatures, (Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 1803),
and set the pattern by which incidental and implied powers of the national
government were to expand the national powers far beyond anything dreamed
of by the states when they ratified the constitution, (McCullock vs. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 1819).
The die was cast and the battle between advocates of state power and
strong central government entered upon a new phase. With each court decision which strengthened the national power, and there were quite a few of
them, the states fumed and there were threats of secession.
Looking back from our present perspective, Marshall has taken on the
roll of the greatest of all of our Chief Justices. He performed a great service
to the country, and had the recognition of incidental powers, as stated in McCullock vs. Maryland, never occurred, we might yet be a hodgepodge of
small nations, with little to pull us together but a common language and a
common fear of the great .foreign powers. However, Marshall was quite
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meticulous to distinguish between strictly local matters and matters which
of necessity called for national power, but even this effort at careful discrimination was not enough to win for him or his court the confidence of
the states.
The states which were the first 'Members of the union were intensely
jealous of their sovereignty. They believed that the union existed for the
benefit of the states and for no other reason. The generally held theory that
a sovereign was not bound, except morally, to its contract was believed in to
the extent that the states considered themselves free to renounce their membership in the union at their own pleasure. This attitude epitomized the
extreme position with respect to states' rights and it took a civil war to
settle, we hope for all time, this aspect of states' rights..
Not always has the court used the logic and meticulous care of Marshall. Had it done so there would no doubt still have been criticism from
some states' righters. There does seem to be a basis for criticism of the
court the logic of which is difficult to combat. I refer to the technique of
reading into the constitution national powers for which the intelligent reader,
even by fair implication can find no basis and in which the conservative contends the court throws out a lot of verbage as camouflage to cover the preconceived belief of the court that such matters should be within the federal
jurisdiction.
May I quote from the court language which makes subsequent language
of the court sound like double talk?
"When the people create a single, entire government they grant at once
all the rights of sovereignty .....
.But
when a federal government is
erected with only a portion of the sovereign power, the rule of construction is directly the reverse and every power is reserved to the members
that is not, either in express terms or by necessary implication, taken away
from them and vested exclusively in the federal head. This rule has been
acknowledged by the most intelligent friends of the constitution but is also
plainly declared by the instrument itself." (9 John, N.Y., 507, 1812)
Also:
"The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does
not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means now ..... .Those
things which are within its grants of power, as those grants were understood
when made, are still within them and those things not within them remain
still excluded." (So. Carolina vs. U.S,, 199 U.S. 347, 1905).
Also:
"Historical origin may be considered and historical evidence may be
resorted to as aids in the construction and application of words and provisions. What went on before the adoption of the constitution may be resorted to for the purpose of throwing light upon its provisions." (Marshall
vs. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 1919).
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Again:
"The law existing at the time the constitution and amendments were
adopted and ratified, is often the best basis for ascertaining the scope and
effects of a constitutional provision." (Mattox vs. U.S., 156 U.S 237, 1895).
"The government of the United States is one of delegated, limited and
enumerated powers. Every act of congress must find in the constitution a
warrant for its passage. By ratifying the constitution the states carved from
their powers such portions as they thought advisable to vest in the national
government. In the field of external power of the United States is complete but in internal matters the United States is not completely sovereign."
(U.S. vs. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 334, 1936).
These are but a few of the many similar quotations which could be
cited from opinions of the court.
Stare decisis, i maxim of the common law of the United States and
approved by the Supreme Court as well as by state courts, is a principle
that a point of law once settled by decisions of a court with final jurisdiction forms a precedent not thereafter to be lightly discarded or reversed.
This principle assumes especial significance in constitutional law.
In 1798 the Supreme Court held that a person who had had his day
in court, by the ordinary procedure of the state where his case was tried,
had had the benefit of due process of law and the federal courts would not
review his case on a lack of due process contention. This attitude of the
Supreme Court (Calder vs. Bull, 3, U.S. 386) was consistently held for
100 years and in reaffirming the principle in 1874, (Gilpin vs. Page, 85
U.S. 350), the court said: "The Circuit Court possesses no revisory powers
over decisions of the Supreme Court of a state, and any arguments to show
that the (state) court mistook the law, and misjudged the jurisdictional fact,
would have been out of place."
This remained the rule of the Supreme Court until 1894 when by- its
decision, (Scott vs. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34), the court constituted itself an
appeal court from every decision of a state supreme court whenever the
question of jurisdiction was involved.
In 1888, (Pembina Consolidated Mining and Milling Co. vs. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181), though the question was not involved, the court,
in its dictum, had said: "Under the designation of person there is no doubt
that a corporation is included." The historical setting of the fourteenth
amendment and the words of the amendment when intrepreted in the light
of this setting certainly do not indicate that there was any person except a
natural person to be included within it provisions. Yet the court in 1889,
(Minneapolis Railroad Co. vs. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26), stated that corporations are persons within the fourteenth amendment and since that
time has never waivered from that position. This inclusion has created a
great mass of litigation for the federal courts, and by making the federal
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courts available to corporations on grounds never intended by the fourteenth
amendment has not only extended the power of the federal government but
has operated to deny states their rightful power over corporations.
The expansion of federal power by court decisions which have interpreted the commerce clause of Article I, Section VIII, of the constitution,
presents a long and interesting story. The provision is short and in rather
plain language. It says: "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the states, and with the Indian Tribes."
What is the meaning of the word "commerce" and of the word "regulate?"
Around these two words and this section is built much of the power of the federal government. Webster and the court have repeatedly defined commerce as
trade, traffic, exchange, and intercourse. To be interstate, or in the language
of the constitution, "among the states," there must be trade, traffic, exchange or intercouse across state lines, and only when this combination occurs
does the constitution confer power upon the federal government to regulate.
It is under this enumerated power to regulate commerce that congress
has enacted all of the federal anti-trust laws, and pure food and drug acts,
created the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, a host of other bureaus and commissions and enacted most of
the federal labor legislation. Many of our citizens labor under the delusion
that much of our federal legislation, particularly that dealing with labor,
is enacted under a federal police power derived through the general welfare clause. The term "general welfare" appears only twice in the Constitution, once in the preamble, from which the federal government derives
no substantive power, and again in the first paragraph of Article I, Section
VIII, which reads: The congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pa) the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States. Arguments
have waxed and waned and waxed again as to whether this provision confers a power upon the federal government to legislate generally for the welfare of the United States or merely to lay and collect taxes for the general
welfare of the United States. It would seem to me that reasonable construction can only result in the latter interpretation so I join with that faction.
The United States does exercise a power over commerce, which is so
similar to police power as to defy distinction, when it excludes from interstate commerce such things as lotteries and goods manufactured with child
labor.
Is this, and much of the labor legislation, regulation of commerce?
Are the relations between management and labor commerce? I don't think
so and neither do I think the federal government has any police power
under the welfare clause to control these matters. You may disagree, or
in agreeing say that the ends justify the means. If so, remember what the
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court itself has said about a written constitution and be prepared to sanction
any usurpation of power which the Supreme Court is willing to sanction.
Raising such a question now may be quite academic, for the Supreme
Court seems to have answered it with finality. It justifies its present position by saying that the federal power extends to anything which "affects"
commerce or tends to "obstruct the free flow" of commerce. And so our
local lumber man or our local retailer may find himself indicted by a
federal grand jury for violation of a law which he believes never was intended to apply to his business.
The Supreme Court, in anti-trust cases, for example in E. C. Knight Co.
vs. U.S., (156 U.S. 1, 1895), and in Oliver Iron Mining Co. vs. Lord, (262
U. S. 172, 1923), has held that manufacturing might precede commerce or
succeed to commerce, but that manufacturing itself was not commerce and
that the federal power did not extend to the control of this local economic
activity. It has held that child labor and maximum hours are purely local
matters not within the federal powers and over which the states had control only by virtue of the police power possessed by those sovereigns. It
has even denied, until recently, the power of the states to legislate minimum
wages and has frustrated attempts of congress to legislate against child labor
under the guise of its taxing power. Despite previous decisions, the Supreme
Court has now condoned the power of the federal government in all of these
matters under the guise of regulating interstate commerce.
What have, we gained and what have we lost by all of this federal encroachment into fields which only so short a time ago were regarded as
wholly within the state powers?
Boldly and without batting an eyelash the court has so stretched the
elastic qualities of the constitution that by reading its simple words alone
one can be only misled as to what it means.
With each newly assumed federal power through acts of congress
which are, to put it mildly, of doubtful constitutionality, and with each new
interpretation by the court finding new basis for the exercise of federal power,
the power of the states is further degraded. Every such act and court decision adds another unit to the army of federal inspectors and agents to interfere, supervise and regulate the daily activities of the citizens of the
United States.
Not all of the people, by any means, who are calling these matters to
the attention of the people of the states and counselling caution against too
great concentration of power in the federal government are alarmists, reactionaries or even in the employ of vested interest as they are accused. Many
of them are earnest students of government and constitutional law, imbuded
with the idea that it is distinctly, in the long run, in public interest that the
safeguards of the constitution for balance of powers between state and national governments be preserved. We think of checks and balances in our
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government primarily because of the constitutional provisions creating three
equal and coordinate branches of government. We are prone to overlook
the checks and balances provided by the framers of the constitution when
they consciously and deliberately enumerated the powers of the federal government and, to make sure they were not misunderstood, added an amendment
very soon after the adoption of the constitution stating that all powers not
granted by the states to the federal government not prohibited to the states
by the constitution are reserved to the states.
May I remaind you again that the constitutional guarantees of freedom
and liberty are not grants to the people by a benevolent government; they
are guarantees by way of limitation which the people put into the constitution to protect themselves from their own government, a government which
they hoped and expected to be and remain benevolent but dared not leave
to chance.
Changing conditions sometimes give things a queer twist. The earliest
conservatives in our national history, the Federalists, led by Hamilton, were
strong advocates of centralized power. The liberals of the same period,
led by Jefferson, were bitter in their opposition and fought pugnaciously for
states' rights on the theory that therein lay the safety of the common man.
Now the position is reversed. The liberals of today advocate support of
centralized power while conservatives either oppose further strengthening
of federal power or hope to give it different direction from the trend of the
last several years.
Don't understand from the remarks I have made that I am wholly opposed to what is commonly referred to as our social and economic progress.
I admit that, being a constitutionalists, I don't approve of what I consider
an unconstitutional usurpation of power by federal government; what I am
objecting to mainly is the method by which the federal government has increased its power and the indifference of our people as to what has happened and how it happened.
Perhaps, as Mr. Lilienthal of T.V.A. says, we are a nation of regions
and no longer a nation of states. Perhaps from an economic viewpoint
state lines are obselete. Even if true, is it license to disregard our written
constitution to do the expedient thing? The oath of all public officials,
elected or appointed, is to uphold the constitution of the United States and
not to uphold the expedient interpretation which they, individually or collectively, place upon it.
With the complexities of modern life in a country so large as ours, the
field of national interest is naturally expanding. Some matters which once
were of purely local concern are not longer such. Were there determination
on the part of states to do so, regional matters could be directed and controlled by the states concerned without dictation from the federal government
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at Washington which has little knowledge and less understanding of local
or regional matters.
Over and above the state and regional interests there is, no doubt, a
public interest which is national in scope. That national interest includes
all of us and the national power when exercised should be for the benefit
of all of us and not for powerful or well organized minority interests alone.
What are the direction signs on the path that lies ahead? Certainly the
future lies in action. If the states' rights advocate would defend his position he must snap out of his lethargy and cause the states to exercise the power
which the states have. He must demonstrate in state action that the states
are capable of doing what .the public interest demands. Could the states
be effective in dealing with these matters of public interest? If the federal
government exists for the benefit of the states and will exercise its powers
on that basis and if the states will work together I believe the states can
take care of the public interest and at the same time preserve our constitutional
government. Elective officials, both state and federal, are generally more
responsive to public opinion than appointive officials. Generally local administration is more responsive than administration removed from the people.
If these premises are sound, administration by the states is preferable to
administration from Washington. We have had a few examples in our
state government to indicate that appointive officials can be quite arbitrary
but none to compare with examples in our federal administration with its
three million or more appointees. The federal government can and should
exercise its taxing power for the general welfare of the United States, but
with a minimum of bureaus and personnel, leaving administration to the
states. To a degree we have seen this operate in old age assistance, unemployment insurance and some other matters which are of general public
interest.
What are the other alternatives?
At various times in our history, one within my own memory-during
the Roosevelt Supreme Court packing controversy-it has been advocated
that the constitution be amended to give the federal government police
power. Such an amendment would no doubt constitutionalize most of the
things which the federal government has done in the field of social legislation. However, such an amendment would so broaden the power of the
federal government as to practically do away with the state power and is
therefore not acceptable to the conservative who is afraid of a strong central government. It would increase tremendously the number of administrative bureaus and commissions and in so doing increase the most dangerous
hazard to our future freedoms.
During the war, war powers enabled the federal government to cope
with the emergency. Except where military necessity dictated otherwise,
publicity was given to the measures taken and the interested public knew
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pretty well what was going on. Appointments were for the duration of the
emergency and we expect a termination of those appointments just as soon
as conditions permit. Strangely, and though the present court would prob,
ably not hold the same, the Supreme Court, during the N.I.R.A. crisis,
said that emergencies do not increase the power of congress. I agree that
under a strict interpretation of the constitution this is true. There are,
however, national emergencies almost as critical as war and which, for our
people at home, could be even more disastrous than any war in which we
have ever engaged. Congress should have the power to declare the existence
of an emergency and, with proper safeguards for the termination of emergency administrative bureaus and boards, be enrpowered to take such steps
as are necessary to remedy the conditions. I would even favor an amendment to this effect in the belief that public opinion could be mustered at
the end of the emergency to terminate federal agencies no longer necessary.
It has not been may purpose to be an alarmist but to call to your attention trends which pose danger for the future of democracy under our constitution. As a middle of the roader I am concerned, for with increasing
concentration of power in Washington it seems to me we are creating conditions in which usurpation becomes ever more possible. Through our schools
and through organizations like this our citizens must be prepared to make
an intelligent choice between the roads which lie ahead.
The conservative who tries only to preserve the status quo is doomed
to lose out. The laws of nature constantly remind us that nothing stands
still. There is constant change, growth or decay. The conservative who
would preserve our constitutional way in American government must have
a plan of action and not a plan of obstruction.

Patton on Titles Missing from Denver District Court Library
The Book Patton on Titles has been withdrawn from the Denver District
Court library without notifying the librarian. This book is in great demand
and additional copies cannot be purchased. All attorneys are requested to

check their desks and libraries to see if this book has been inadvertently misplaced. Anyone finding the missing volume is requested to notify the district court librarian.
New Members of Denver Bar Association
The following were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar Association at the May 6, 1946 meeting:
VIRGIL

A.

LININGER

DONALD

LON J. PUTNAM

C. MCKINLAY
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April Meeting of Denver Bar Association Was
Junior Bar Day
The April 1, 1946 meeting of the Denver Bar Association was devoted
to a program arranged by the Junior Bar Section of the Colorado Bar Association. Sidney E. Shuteran, chairman of the section, presided. In introducing the program chairman Shuteran said that ten years ago junior members of the bar were members in name only. However, since the organzation of the Junior Bar Section, junior members have become quite active,
and many of the present important committees of the association were
nurtured by the Junior Bar Section. The Junior Bar is vitally interested in
all matters affecting the interest of the young lawyers. Many of them
who served in the war are now back in active practice and are very much
interested in the activity of the bar association. They know that this association will represent their interests.
William F. Dwyer, chairman of the Public Information Committee of
the Junior Bar Section discussed the public information program of the
Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar Association and the plans of
the Colorado Junior Bar Section to develop a local public information program. It will be the purpose of the program to inform the public on the
services which lawyers can render.
T. Raber Taylor discussed the On-the-Job Lawyer-Veteran Training
Program and William R. Newcomb discussed Minimum.Fee Schedules.
Both of these addresses are published in this issue of DICTA.

Minimum Fee Schedulest
By

WILLIAM

R.

NEWCOMB*

The subject which I have been given to discuss, Minimum Fee Schedules,
is at the present time a very live question among the members of the Denver
Bar Association. Recently a committee was selected by the president of our
association to consider and to make recommendations for a schedule of
minimum fees in this city. We have had two meetings in the past two
weeks and I think I may say that progress is being made.
In my remarks today, however, I am not speaking as a member of
this committee. I am speaking as a young lawyer who faces a future of
practising law in Denver and who has wondered from time to time whether
or not his bar association is willing to and can meet problems that are common
to all lawyers. As I view the question of minimum fee schedules I see
it as only one aspect of a many-sided problem. For instance, there is the
tAn Address Before the Denver Bar Association, April 1, 1946.
*Of the Denver Bar.
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practice of law in Denver by unauthorized persons. In how many cities
does the legal profession allow real estate agents to prepare land contracts?
Certainly the preparation of a contract, involving as it does the disposition
of a most important form of property and involving numerous purely legal
questions, is the practice of law. Yet in our city the legal profession apparently sanctions this dangerous and unwarranted custom. In too many
cases a contract prepared by a real estate agent does not state the intention
of the parties and ultimately leads to litigation between the vendor and the
vendee, and, in every case, some lawyer is deprived of a real estate transaction, a piece of business which is rightfully his by virtue of this special training and his license from the state. Annually we are innocent spectators to
the income tax phenomenon. The so-called "income tax experts" descend
like a swarm of locusts, without permanent offices, with no responsibility,
and in far too many cases without training or ability, and eke from the
public thousands of dollars in fees each year for services of doubtful value.
Needless to say income tax work can best be performed only by the attorney
and by the registered or certified public accountant. It is, of course, true
that this situation has been caused to a great extent by the increased magnitude of the job in recent years, and by the physical inability of the profession to cope with it. But, we must also admit to ourselves that the situation
has partly been caused by the unwillingness of many lawyers to burden
themselves with the task of filling out income tax forms or with the knowledge which such a job entails.
Minimum fee schedules it seems to me are particularly, although not
exclusively, the concern of the younger lawyer. There are at least three
reasons for this. First, the young lawyer is generally in a predicament as to
what to charge a client for his services. Often he consults with an older
attorney for advice, but even that older attorney in many cases plucks a
figure from nowhere and attaches to it the label of "reasonable." How much
easier it would be for everyone concerned and how much more satisfactory
to the client were that lawyer able to take a printed fee schedule from his
desk drawer and say to his client, "This is the fee which has been approved
by the Denver Bar Association in conformity with the canons of legal ethics
of the profession. If your case is the routine matter which it might be, I will
charge you the fee shown on the schedule; if it turns out that your case
has complications or entails a greater amount of effort than is now forseeable
I shall reserve the right to charge you a higher fee, because this schedule
says only what the minimum fee is to be in cases involving routine effort
on my part."
The second reason why a minimum fee schedule is particularly (although
certainly not exclusively) the concern of young lawyers is the economic uncertainty which they face in practising law in Denver. I suppose that all
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of you have seen Bill Robinson's remarkable survey which appeard in DICTA
in the December 1945 issue. If there are any of you who have not, I
recommend that you do so in order to appreciate the gravity of this phase
of the problem. Certainly, this condition has been caused to some extent
because prevailing fees have been much too low. Minimum fee schedules,
therefore, should have a primary objective of raising the fees for many types
of work. The most current illustration of too low a charge involves abstract
examination. Few of us will disagree that the prevailing charges for this
type of work are fantastically low. No one seems to know how the figure
of $15.00 began but certainly it is a hangover from the days of few entries
on an abstract and low office overhead and living costs for the attorney.
The value of real estate in Denver may have more than doubled in the past
few years, but the attorney's task, even though increasingly difficult and responsible receives the same compensation in the amount of $15.00. On every
hand one hears the lawyer complain about this situation and yet individually
he can do nothing without the risk of being called at worst a "shyster" or at
least a "high charger" by the public. Only through unity and collective
action can the attorneys remedy their plight, if it is remedy we desire.
The third and final reason why a proposal for a minimum fee schedule
is particularly the concern of the younger members of the Bar, is the failure
to date of our elder members to solve the problem. I do not say this as
criticism, but as simple fact. I believe that attempts have been made in the
past to establish minimum fees and, I have heard, they have failed. As to
whether or not a minimum fee schedule can "succeed" in the future depends to some extent upon one's definition of "success." In my mind if
such a schedule merely furnishes protection to the lawyer in making his
charges, knowing that he has the considered opinion of the organized bar
behind him, it is a success. The schedule has justified its existence. Another
measure of "success," of course, is the uniformity of application of the fee
schedule by Denver lawyers. I believe that enlightened self-interest would
cause the great majority to charge accordingly. There would be under cutting, of course, in an attempt by some lawyers to build a larger clientele;
but I don't believe that the reputable lawyer would be frightened particularly by that sort of competition. That doesn't seem to have been the result in other cities where attorneys have satisfactorily established minimum
fee schedules.
In the last analysis, however, the successful accomplishment of this
task, will represent far more than an effort to achieve the limited objectives
which are directly involved. It will be a decisive movement toward effective
unity and cooperation among the members of the bar. Collective action
taken this time for the common good can emphasize the need for greater unification of lawyers in a whole-hearted effort to raise the profession in public
esteem, once again, to the heights which have been its glory in the past.
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On-the-Job Training and Self-Employment
Readjustment Benefits for the
Lawyer-Veterant
By T.

RABER TAYLOR

The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, commonly called the "G.I.
Bill of Rights," was passed to provide federal government aid in the readjustment to civilian life of the returning Warld War II veterans. For the
lawyer-veteran's readjustment, there are two types of benefits of special
interest; these are: on-the-job training benefits, and self-employment readjustment benefits. Although the act also provides for loans up to $4,000 to
start in practice, they will not be discussed in this article.
On-The-Job Training Benefits
All persons who have served in active military or naval service on or
after September 6, 1940, and prior to the termination of World War II,
and whose release has been under conditions other than dishonorable, are
eligible for on-the-job training. An eligible lawyer-veteran is entitled to
on-the-job traiping for a period of one year, and in addition thereto, for a
period of time that he, or she, was in the service, but in no event for longer
than four years. Most lawyer-veterans over twenty five, who had completed their legal education and been admitted, or who had practiced for
a short while, would probably not desire more than a yearor two of retraining.
The on-the-job training can be furnished by any employer on the approved list. In each state there is an appropriate state agency which passes
upon the qualifications of the employers desiring to employ veterans for onthe-job training. In Colorado, the Governor's War Advisory Committee,
Midland Savings Building, Denver 2, Colorado (telephone number MAin
6624) receives the applications from the employers. Some experienced
lawyers have already made application to this committee for approval, and
are employing lawyer-veterans.
The lawyer-veteran, desiring on-the-job training and subsistence allowance thereunder, applies to the Veterans' Administration for a certificate of
eligibility and entitlement.
When an experienced lawyer, approved by the governor's committee,
hires an eligible lawyer-veteran, the veteran will be paid a subsistence allowance of $65 a month if without dependents, or $90 a month if he has dependents. This subsistence is given so long as the combined salary, paid by
the approved employer, and the subsistence, paid by the Veterans' Administration, does not exceed the minimum objective salary specified in the employer's
tSummary of Remarks Before the Denver Bar Association, April 1, 1946.
*Of the Denver Bar.
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application. The actual amount of subsistence, which the trainee can receive,
is based upon the specific schedule which the employer-trainer is required
to furnish.
The Board of Governors of Colorado Bar Association has expressed its
desire to aid the returning lawyerveteran, and has approved of the on-thejob training program. It has also recommended to all local bar associations
that they disseminate information in their communities in order that the
benefits of the act will be operative.
Ralph L. Carr, president of the Denver Bar Association, appointed
Charles A. Baer as chairman, and James F. Price, Dean of the Denver University Law School, John R. Turnquist, and Donald M. Lesher, as members
of a committee to suggest standards to the Governor's War Advisory Committee for on-the-job training for Denver lawyer-veterans. The standards
being established by the Denver Bar Association as to the minimum starting
salary and minimum objective salary at the end of the training period, will
apply to Denver, but not to other communities in Qolorado.
The Denver committee, because of the variations between individual
law offices and individual attorneys, did not, in their initial report, establish
any standards as to the hours of employment, type of work to be required
by the trainee, or the variety of law to be studied or practised.
It is obvious that it could be suggested to the employer-trainer that the
training program might include a study of the procedure, and a witnessing of
cases before, not only civil, probate, criminal, and police courts, but also
before administrative bodies, such as the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, the Colorado Industrial Commission, the National Labor Relations
Board, U. S. Tax Court, and, if possible, the Federal Power Commission and
Interstate Commerce Commission.
This article prescinds from any consideration of the details which are
being worked out between the governor's committee and the local bar associations. The purpose of this article is to encourage experienced lawyers,
as well as law firms, to give on-the-job training to lawyer-veterans.
Self-Employment Readjustment Benefits
Any person qualified by reason of military or naval service, and discharged under other than dishonorable conditions, who resides in the United
States and is self-employed for profit in any independent business or profession, may be eligible for a readjustment allowance. He is, if his net
earnings are less than $100 in the previous month, entitled to receive the
difference (adjusted to the next highest multiple of $1) between $100 and
his net earnings for such month.
Claims by such persons for allowances for months of self-employment
must be filed at a local office or by mail on forms prescribed by the administrator, not later than the twentieth day of the month following that for which
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the claim is made. A delay in filing bars a later filing unless serious cause
is shown.
In order to receive the readjustment allowance, the self-employed lawyer,
veteran files his claim at the nearest United States Employment Service
office. On his first visit he must present to the clerk all of his discharge papers
in order that his account may be set up. On the first visit, and all subsequent visits he must have with him a statement of his cash receipts and disbursements for the month in which he claims. The disbursements can only
cover expense items; capital disbursements for equipment, etc., are not
deductible.
In making application for the self-employment benefits, the lawyerveteran does not have to obtain a certificate of eligibility and entitlement from
the Veterans' Administration.
Conclusion
The value of this article depends upon the cooperation of the members
of the bar in bringing to the attention of the lawyer-veterans, and to other
lawyers, the on-the-job training benefits and the self-employment readjustment benefits given in the Servicemen's Readjustment Act.
Therefore, it is requested that you, who have seen fit to read this
article, will pass the word.

Our Returning Lawyer-Veterans
G. PRESTON, lt. col., Judge Advocate General's department, formerly
in Chemical Warfare Service, served from June 1942 at Edgewood Arsenal,
Maryland and at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver. Col. Preston was
county judge of Adams County at the time he entered service, and had held
that position for ten years. Prior to that time he had been engaged in
general practice for ten years. He is a graduate of Eureka College and
Westminster Law School and was admitted to the bar of Colorado in 1922.
He is not at present definitely located. He resides at Aurora.
HOMER

STRICKLAND, JR., capt., Army Air Corps, served from May 1942
to may 1946 in the continental U. S. and Okinawa. He received citation
from Brig. Gen. D. C. Swatland. He has returned to practice as a member of
the firm of Strickland and Strickland, 425 Denver National Bank Bldg.,
Denver.
DUDLEY W.

S. ROBERT HOUCHENS, capt., Infantry, A. U. S., served from March 1942
to April 1946 in the U. S., England, France and Germany. In France and
Germany he fought with the 45th Infantry Division until May 1, 1945, at
which time he was assigned to the Judge Advocate General's department,
7th Army Headquarters, where he served until his return to the United
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States in March 1946. He has resumed practice with the firm of Houtchens
and Houtchens, 318 Greeley Bldg., Greeley.
HAWTHORNE, It. (j.g.), U. S. N. R., served overseas for
twenty-five months, first with the 79th Construction Battalion and then on
the staff of the commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet. Before going
overseas he was assistant to the executive officer of the Supply Department,
New York Navy Yard. Following graduation from the School of Law of
the University of Colorado in 1940, he was associated with Charles J.
Moynihan in Montrose. He then went to Washington where he was legal
representative to the Treasury Department, Price Adjustment Board, and
then secretary of the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board. The work
of both of these boards related to renegotiation of war contracts, and he
was in renegotiation work until he reported for active duty in the Navy
in February 1944. He is now engaged in general practice of law in his own
office in the Harrison Bldg., Canon City.
JAMES HARRISON

Personals
G. WALTER BOWMAN, clerk of the United States District Court for Colorado,
has been appointed clerk of the international military tribunal of the far east.
fie will go to Tokyo as clerk of the court trying war criminals. He will be
on leave of absence for six months from the Colorado court. CHARLES A.
MANTZ, Denver, who has spent some time in Japan, and HERBERT W. DE,
LANEY, Littleton, formerly clerk of the referee in the bankruptcy office in
Denver, have been nominated by Bowman to accompany him.
LT. COL. ROYAL R. IRWIN, Denver, has been elected president of the Denver
chapter of the Reserve Officers Association. Other officers include: COL.
ARTHUR W. KRAUSS, first vice-president; LT. COL. EDWIN P. VAN CISE,
judge advocate.

Upon Information and Belief
Fair Compensation for Public Servants
The lawyers of Colorado have carved out for themselves some rather
important undertakings. In addition to establishing a more cohesive bar
organization, and improving the status of the members of the bar-those
things which are of primary benefit to the lawyers themselves-they have
undertaken to improve our state judicial structure, revise our criminal procedure, improve our traffic courts, study the problem of juvenile delinquency,
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give assistance to persons in military service and their families, and to the
returning veteran, adopt real estate title standards, and improve our laws.
These undertakings are all highly commendable. We would like to challenge
the lawyers of Colorado and Denver to undertake one more great program
a program worthy of their best efforts, and one which will bring its reward
in better government-that of paying fair compensation to public servants.
We are thinking of the city truck drivers, the capitol building janitors,
clerks and stenographers, the teachers in our public schools and higher institutions, and the heads of our governmental departments; but we are also
thinking of our elected state officials, our mayors, our judges and our lawmakers.
In Denver, the mayor receives $6,000 annually, the city attorney $5,000,
and the four managers $4,000 each. The councilmen receive $1,200, except
the president, who receives $1,800. These salaries were fixed by charter
amendment in 1917-thirty years ago-and many changes have taken place
since then.
Our district judges receive $5,000 a year; our Supreme Court judges
receive $6,500 a year; and our county judges receive from $7,000 a year in
Denver to practically nothing in our smaller counties. Some county judges
will receive an increase, wholly inadequate, during their next term of office.
The governor has received a recent increase-from $5,000 to $10,000, and
most of the other elected state officials will receive $1,000 a year increases during the next term. Members of the state legislature receive the tremendous
compensation of $1,000 for two years-which has been the amount received
by them since 1910-and many changes in economics have taken place since
then.
Since most of these salaries have been fixed, living costs and including
income taxes have increased greatly. There is a proposal to increase the
salaries of federal judges $5,000 a year each. In many cases this increase will
not pay the increased income taxes since the old salaries were established.
It has often been said that increased salaries will induce men of higher
caliber to seek public office. We are not convinced that history has born
caliber to seek public office. We are not convinced that hsitory has borne
sons have not sought public office because they could not afford to do so at
the compensation paid. Several congressmen have resigned recently, giving
as a reason the inadequacy of the compensation, particularly as compared with
what they could make in private industry. In this state a very competent
judge recently resigned to enter private practice. We have no doubt that he
can earn much more in private practice than he can on the bench. We know
of others who have failed to seek election or reelection for the same reason.
However, a better reason for paying adequate compensation is the question of fair play. As a matter of public pride, we should pay our public
servants a decent compensation for serving us and listening to our many com-
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plaints. And as a matter of good business, shouldn't we expect more out of
officials and employees who are paid a decent wage?
So, lawyers of Colorado and Denver, here is a challenge to you. Will you
enlist in the cause of paying fair compensation to public servants? What
value do you place upon government of the people, by the people and for
the people?

Opportunity for Lawyers to Serve Abroad
The following letter has been received:
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
1140 NORTH DEARBORN

STREET

CHICAGO 10, ILLINOIS

Dear Sir:
The American Bar Association has received a request from the Department of
State for assistance in the selection of attorneys to serve as "Military Government Court
Officers" in Germany. This letter is addressed to you in compliance with that request
and in the belief that you can be of assistance. I suggest that, if you know of any
qualified men who might be interested, you acquaint them with the contents of this
letter and ask them to communicate with:
Boyd Fisher, Recruitment Officer,
Departmnent of State
2049 Munitions Building
Washington, 25, D. C.
The general requirements and duties of this assignment and the compensation
incident thereto have been outlined to us, as follows:
Acceptance of the assignment will necessitate leaving family and commitments
here for a year and serving under military leadership in circumstances alien to the
experience of established men of the bar. The prestige of the United States rules out
any candidates without a high-grade legal education, a broad background in or with
a good firm, considerable forensic experience, totaling not less than from three to five
years, possibly some civic experience, and certainly inherent qualities pointing to the
candidate's capacity to uphold the honor and competence of the American Bar in a
wholly unusual setting.
The duties of the assignment will include service at various times as judge or
prosecutor in military government courts; preparation of opinions and advice to superiors
on military government and German International Law; making recommendations on
proposed German legislation, and reviewing cases already heard in military government courts. Knowledge of German would be desired, but is not requisite.
The salary is based on $6,230 per annum, with 25 per cent added for overseas
maintenance, totaling around $7,787. The Army furnishes round-trip transportation and
provides meals and lodging at a very low rate (around $50 per month). Many of the
qualified civilian leaders already at work have, obviously, earned more than compensation of this order. The appeal of the assignment, therefore, is likely to be partly in the
unusual experience it offers and partly in the opportunity it presents to advance the
cause of peace.
It will be greatly appreciated if you will give this matter your prompt and
careful attention.
Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH D. STECHER,
Secretary.
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